



# CAMPAIGN TO **STOP** KILLER ROBOTS



## Report on Activities

Convention on Conventional Weapons Group of Governmental Experts  
on lethal autonomous weapons systems

United Nations Geneva

2020

## About this report


This report details activities by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems held at the United Nations (UN) in Geneva and virtually on 21-25 September 2020. It also covers the period through the end of 2020.

The report records the campaign's contributions, reviews the participation of governments in these meetings, and its annexes provide a summary of country views and the campaign's delegation list.

Campaign coordinator Mary Wareham and arms associate Jacquelyn Kantack of Human Rights Watch prepared this report, drawing from statements posted online by the CCW implementation support unit and WILPF's Reaching Critical Will Project.

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is grateful for the generous donor support that enabled us to have a strong presence at the CCW meetings and to conduct outreach in the lead-up and afterwards.

This report is available on the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots website at:  
[www.stopkillerrobots.org/publications](http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/publications).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Mary Wareham', written in a cursive style.

Mary Wareham  
Washington DC  
17 February 2021

**Contents**

**About this report** ..... 2

**Contents** ..... 3

**Lead-up to the CCW Group of Governmental Experts Meeting** ..... 4

**CCW Group of Governmental Experts Meeting** ..... 4

**Campaign Activities** ..... 6

**Annex I: Country Views on Killer Robots** ..... 15

**Annex II: Campaign Delegation List** ..... 22

## Lead-up

At the CCW's annual meeting in November 2019, states agreed to continue the work of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) established in 2016. They approved Mr. Janis Karklins of Latvia as GGE chair and scheduled two CCW GGE meetings in 2020, on 22-26 June and 10-14 August.

In February 2020, representatives from several CCW states including Russia and the US participated in a Symposium on Autonomous Weapons convened by the government of Brazil in Rio de Janeiro. Campaigners from Article 36, Human Rights Watch, and SEHLAC also attended.

The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020 then led to the postponement or cancellation of subsequent meetings associated with and then held by the CCW. Certain states adapted, most notably Germany, which held the Berlin Forum on Lethal Autonomous Weapons on 1-2 April 2020 attended by representatives from 63 countries and civil society and featuring remarks from German foreign minister Heiko Maas and UN disarmament chief Izumi Nakamitsu.

The CCW postponed its planned June and August meetings. It finally went ahead to hold the ninth CCW meeting on LAWS to 21-25 September. This report covers the September 2020 meeting as no CCW meetings have been held since then, as of mid-February 2021.

The GGE chair Janis Karklins invited states to submit "commentary" papers on the operationalization of principles agreed by the CCW in 2017 and 2018. At least 34 states submitted national commentaries to the CCW in the second half of 2020, either individually or as a collective, in addition to the ICRC, iPRAW, and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots.<sup>1</sup>

In August 2020, Ambassador Karklins [circulated a commonalities paper](#) reviewing the papers received. He then stepped down from the GGE chair position and was replaced by Mr. Jivan Gjorgjinski of North Macedonia, who chaired the September GGE meeting. The Campaign held an informal consultation with the GGE chair on 22 September.

## CCW GGE Meeting held September 2020

At least 54 states participated in the September 2020 meeting, a significant decrease from the 94 that attended the previous meeting in August 2019.<sup>2</sup> Other participants included UN agency

---

<sup>1</sup> States that submitted individual commentary papers include Australia, Austria, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mauritius, Netherlands, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. A joint paper was submitted by Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Ireland, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, and New Zealand, in addition to a paper by the Non-Aligned Movement.

<sup>2</sup> A full list of participants was not released, but at least 54 states participated: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Holy See, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Spain, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

UNIDIR, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. The lower attendance was due to physical distancing requirements implemented by the UN but most likely because registration for it only opened days before. It was the first meeting to be held in a hybrid format and to be live broadcast on UN Web TV.

The [agenda](#) for the September 2020 GGE meeting built on the report of the 2019 GGE meetings and covered six well-worn topics.<sup>3</sup> This was the ninth CCW meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems since the talks began in 2014.<sup>4</sup>

During the meeting, nearly all states expressed agreement on the need to preserve meaningful human control over the use of force. Many identified similar components of human control, calling for a combination of prohibitions and positive obligations, and recommending prohibiting autonomous weapons systems that target humans or rely on machine learning.”

The Campaign regards human control is fundamental to prevent the automation of killing and welcomes the interest shown by many states in themes that parallel the proposed essential treaty elements [outlined by the Campaign](#). Further substantive work is required to determine the type and extent of human control necessary to ensure compliance with applicable law and respond to ethical concerns.

This was the sixth GGE meeting on LAWS since it was [established by the 2016 Review Conference](#) to “explore and agree on possible recommendations on options related to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.” Unsurprisingly, the way ahead in terms of regulation again saw many divisions.

There were no additions to the list of 30 countries calling for a ban on killer robots, but many reiterated that position during the meeting, including Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Peru, and Venezuela. China suggested states emulate the CCW protocol that preemptively bans blinding lasers.

During the meeting, Iraq made a statement on behalf of 12 Arab states parties to the CCW, which called for a new treaty to prohibit and restrict lethal autonomous weapons systems, reiterated that other measures cannot replace the required legally binding instrument, and

---

<sup>3</sup> The topics covered a) potential challenges posed by emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems to international humanitarian law; b) characterization and concepts of the systems under consideration; c) Further consideration of the human element in the use of lethal force and aspects of human-machine interaction; d) review of potential military applications of related technologies; e) possible options for addressing the humanitarian and international security challenges posed; and f) recommendations in relation to the clarification, consideration and development of aspects of the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons

<sup>4</sup> Previously, 94 states participated in the last CCW meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems in August 2019, while 87 attended in March 2019, 84 attended in April 2018, 90 attended in August 2018, 86 attended in November 2017, 94 attended in 2016, 90 in 2015, and 87 in 2014.

underscored the importance of maintaining human control over the critical functions of weapons.<sup>5</sup>

France, Israel, Netherlands, and the United States called moves to create a new treaty “premature” and suggested other measures that fall short of new international law. There were proposals for compilations of existing international humanitarian law, compendiums of best practices and political declarations. Some states sought more principles to guide CCW deliberations on killer robots, in addition to those agreed in 2018 and 2019.

Russia did not attend the meeting, after expressing procedural concerns in the lead-up and suggesting meetings be postponed until 2021. Russia [threatened beforehand](#) that there would be consequences if the September 2020 meeting went ahead without it.

Another CCW meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems was supposed to be held on 2-6 November 2020, before the CCW’s annual meeting on 11-13 November. But neither has proceeded as of February 2021. Key decisions on the GGE’s mandate, office holders, and meeting dates for 2021 still have not been taken. The CCW appears to be stalled.

## Campaign Activities

The Campaign held its [second global meeting](#) in Buenos Aires, Argentina on 26-28 February 2020, which was attended by more than 80 campaigners from 25 countries. The global meeting included a press conference that concluded with the signing of a cooperation agreement between the Campaign and the Argentinian Scouts organization, as well as meetings with government officials. The Argentinian Senate issued a [proclamation](#) welcoming the Campaign’s global meeting and presence in Argentina.

In July 2020, the Campaign [hosted](#) an event at the digital “RightsCon” on how data is being used in the development of fully autonomous weapons and why it is not too late to reverse the trend.

In June 2020, it was announced that the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots was [awarded](#) the Ypres Peace Prize, awarded by the Belgian city every three years since 2002. The prize shows how interest in the Campaign is growing across the world, especially among children, as ninety percent of those who voted for the prize were age 18 or younger. The award was scheduled to be presented in November 2020, but was postponed to 2021 due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

In August 2020, Human Rights Watch published a report, “[Stopping Killer Robots: Country Positions on Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons and Retaining Human Control](#),” which reviews the policies of the 97 countries that had publicly elaborated their views on killer robots at the time of publication.

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots official delegation to the September 2020 CCW meeting consisted of ten representatives from Canada, Colombia, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the

---

<sup>5</sup> There are 12 Arab states parties to the CCW include Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.

United States (see Annex II), with dozens of additional campaigners closely following the meetings via the UN livestream.

During the September 2020 CCW meetings, Campaign representatives met virtually with delegates from dozens of countries. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots published web posts at the [beginning](#) and [end](#) of the meeting.

For more information, please see:

- CCW [2020 GGE website](#)
- WILPF Reaching Critical Will [2020 CCW webpage](#)

## **2020 CCW GGE Commentaries on Killer Robots**

As of February 2021, 26 CCW states had submitted 2020 commentaries to the UN: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mauritius, Netherlands, Panama, Portugal, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela, well as a joint paper by Austria, Belgium, Chile, Ireland, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, and New Zealand. The papers can be found on the UN [2020 GGE website](#).

### **Australia**

Strengthening compliance with existing IHL, including through Article 36 reviews, is the most effective way to manage new weapons systems, including the potential development of LAWS... In this context, Australia has consistently argued that discussions concerning a treaty banning LAWS are premature in the absence of an agreed definition and understanding of the technology – including the benefits it may provide. Australia believes that it is neither necessary nor desirable to ban or create new legal frameworks to regulate LAWS, as this technology may provide many benefits including minimising incidental harm to civilians and reducing risks to military personnel. Instead, we suggest that compliance with existing IHL, including the conduct of Article 36 reviews, may serve to mitigate many of the concerns voiced by some CCW States Parties and interest groups.

### **Austria**

Austria considers the necessity of developing specific international law in the context of autonomous weapon systems without meaningful human control over the selection and engagement of a target as an urgent matter to be dealt with by the international community. In our view, it is key to preserve human moral dignity, the rule of law and international security as a whole. The absence of clear legal norms regulating LAWS might ultimately challenge many of the previous achievements in international law, international humanitarian law, the ethical principles enshrined as a minimum standard in the Martens clause and human rights law. In the past, in cases where states felt the need to further clarify international law, more specific regulations were adopted. Under the CCW, the Protocol IV is a case in point, where states given the potential gravity of such weapons being developed, recognized that blinding laser weapons should be prohibited preemptively. In Austria's view the GGE should urgently intensify focus and efforts on minimum requirements for human control, with a view to adopting a legally binding norm.

### **Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Ireland, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, and New Zealand**

In our view, the guiding principles do not in any way constitute the end point of the work of the GGE. We consider them a useful and valuable starting point to build substance towards a normative and operational framework.... Considering all the issues developed above, we are of the view that a normative and operational framework should ensure that human control is exerted

and retained over critical functions of any weapons system based on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.

### **Brazil**

Brazil proposes initiating negotiations of a legally binding instrument on LAWS in the form of a new Protocol to the CCW...The codification of new IHL rules could establish a balance between, on the one hand, defense and security needs and technological development without establishing asymmetries among “haves” and “have nots” and, on the other, compliance with humanitarian principles and normative.

### **Colombia**

At national level, the operationalization of the 11 guiding principles may have several administrative and financial implications, thus the National Government will have to determine how they will be implemented, not only as a short or medium term policy, but as public policy that may last in time and progress as its institutions do so.

### **Costa Rica**

Our delegation has cautioned against stirring the work of the GGE solely based on the guiding principles, as they do not constitute an end in themselves, nor enjoy any legal status...Costa Rica underscores that proposals for a political declaration, code of conduct, and other voluntary and confidence building measures, including national weapons review processes, are not exclusive but complementary. The aforementioned shall not preclude the development of an international binding agreement stipulating prohibitions and regulations on AWS.

### **Cuba**

With regard to the 11 guiding principles adopted by said Group, we believe that they constitute a starting point for identifying and clarifying common understandings and that they could serve as a basis for the negotiations and subsequent developments of a regulatory framework. While these principles can be further developed, they cannot by themselves curb the threat posed by lethal autonomous weapons systems, nor do they replace the need for a strict, legally binding international regulatory framework that includes a ban on weapons not subject to human control...Although we do not have programs associated with the development of this type of weaponry, Cuban national legislation regulates aspects directly related to the observance of the principles of international humanitarian law and, therefore, to the operationalization of these two guiding principles... In Cuban national legislation, articles 5, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of Act No. 22, "Military Crimes Act", of February 15th 1979, provide dispositions for aspects related to the military chain of command and the individual responsibility of combatants. Said provisions relate to the operationalization of these three guiding principles.

## Finland

“... ensure that future LAWS comply with IHL is to define a framework for their legitimate use. At the same time, putting in place measures that enable the responsible use of new technology will have obvious benefits also for the implementation of IHL.”

## France

Promises not to develop fully autonomous weapons and wants human control but not new law.

“Therefore, the measures aimed at operationalizing the eleven guiding principles must above all be based on the general principle of applying existing IHL: setting out the application of existing IHL for the weapons systems.”

## Germany

Report of the Berlin Forum for Supporting the 2020 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (1-2 April 2020), which finds “the guiding principles in their existing form are not an end point. They require further clarification and interpretation in view of their finalization as part of the envisaged normative and operational framework.”

## **Guatemala**

The current international legislation is not yet adapted to the challenges posed by a possible use of LAWS and for that reason Guatemala favors the adoption of an international legally binding instrument that provides for the prohibition of lethal autonomous weapons systems to fulfill the existing accountability gaps.

## Israel

Israel believes that the measures aimed at operationalizing the eleven Guiding Principles should be based on the general principle of applying existing IHL to the potential development and use of weapon systems based on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.

## Italy

We believe that there is great value in pursuing further exchanges in the Convention on Certain Weapons (CCW) which we believe is the most appropriate framework for dealing with the issues of emerging technologies in the area of LAWS, as highlighted by the guiding principle “k”, concerning national policies and practices on the development and use of weapons with autonomous functions. Such exchanges – that should be conducted with due respect for national security needs and industrial property rights – could help identify good practices, challenges and related possible solutions. In addition to providing useful, practical input, exchanges on national experiences in legal reviews could also help build confidence among High Contracting Parties on the continued conformity of emerging weapons systems with International Humanitarian Law.

## Japan

With regard to the relationship with international law and ethics, principles of IHL must be upheld in the development and operations of all weapons systems including LAWS. Any

violation of IHL by using autonomous weapons systems should be attributed to States or individual persons as is the case with conventional weapons systems.

### **Mauritius**

However, the extent of the human-machine interaction or control needs to be decided. This could only be implemented if there is an existing treaty which could legally bind member States to develop legal instrument within which they have to operate, hence rendering them accountable for their uses and acts.

### **Netherlands**

The Netherlands considers this a key principle for the debate on LAWS and a clear acknowledgement that there is an existing legal and normative framework, which fully applies to LAWS. The normative framework that applies to LAWS incorporates not only the entire body of international humanitarian law (IHL) but also includes other relevant legal provisions of international law, including Human Rights Law.... In the view of the Netherlands, the existing legal regime is adequate to ensure accountability. While there may be a shift within the responsible chain of human command and control on where accountability lies, there is no accountability gap as regards the deployment of LAWS, because the decision to deploy, taken in the framework of the targeting process, remains with humans. In the Netherlands, in accordance with the applicable legal framework on all levels of decision-making, the targeting process guides decisions about the selection and attack of targets. At the moment, there is no reason to assume that there will be an erosion of the accountability under criminal law of commanders, subordinates or those in positions of political or administrative responsibility, nor is there a gap in state responsibility as regards the deployment of LAWS.

### **Panama**

The guiding principles constitute a useful basis for the evolving deliberations in the GGE on LAWS. Notwithstanding, they were never supposed to be an end in themselves, as they are not sufficient to provide a timely response to ethical, legal, technical and security concerns, nor do they replace the urgent need for a legally binding instrument. Against this background, Panama considers that the GGE on LAWS should proceed with its mandate and start the consideration and development of aspects of the normative and operational framework instead of focusing on the operationalization of the guiding principles at national level. In the face of the growing weaponization of AI, new measures are necessary to ensure compliance with international law, including but not limited to international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and that humans always maintain control over the use of force. All weapons systems which cannot fulfill these requirements should be banned.

### **Portugal**

Portugal cautions that the Guiding Principles represent the lowest common denominator of consensus within the GGE-LAWS and should therefore not be interpreted as an end in themselves nor as a deliverable able to fulfil the mandate of the GGE-LAWS on its own... Among other activities at the GGE-LAWS, Portugal once again stresses the need for an exercise

towards a clarification, consideration and development of aspects of other normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.

## **Poland**

Human control over the weapons systems and the use of force must be maintained to ensure compliance with international law and to respond to ethical concerns. ... We expect that in the near future the attention of individual CCW States Parties will rather focus on elaborating national standards for autonomous systems and preparing a common position through regional organizations.

## **Russia**

We are deeply convinced that it is inadmissible to artificially divide weapons into "bad" and "good" basing on political preferences of individual States. We reaffirm our readiness to further discuss LAWS issues on the basis of the discussion mandate and agreed agenda of the relevant GGE.... The Russian Federation fully implements the guiding principles on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS approved by the GGE on LAWS in 2018-2019. We call on the CCW States Parties to follow these principles responsibly and to continue exchanging information on specific practical measures for their national implementation in order to build confidence and increase transparency.

## **South Africa**

It would be more prudent to agree on the operational or normative framework, before any discussion of implementation could take place, otherwise it would lead to a “cart before the horse” situation.

## **Spain**

Spain reiterates that the respect of IHL requires sufficient human control on all weapons systems, as well as an attribution of legal responsibility to the operator and the person who orders their use. ... Human-out-of-the-loop weapons, capable of selecting targets and using the force without any human input or interventions, should be considered incompatible with the meaningful human control requirement. ... for a future political declaration and a politically binding code of conduct, the determination of a set of rules can be explored.

## **Sweden**

In a military context, rules, regulations and procedures should form a hierarchy of instructions for all operations involving weapons. They should cover, inter alia, the organization, procedures, safety, basic command concepts, control of risk and necessary training requirements. Manuals and training programs for all systems should accompany the regulations. Any complex system must have rigorous handling regulations, including methods for training and procedures for use. Measures to ensure human control should be considered in the entire life cycle of a weapons system. The specific measures will be context dependent. A system's type of target as well as spatial and temporal limits are likely to be important factors. In the development of regulations, procedures, manuals and training programs, the human-machine interaction and its limitations

need to be taken into account. In the legal weapons review process (“Article 36”), an analysis must be performed to ensure that it will be possible to use a given weapons system in compliance with IHL. This analysis should include aspects of human-machine interaction and the ways in which they are addressed in manuals and training programs.

### Switzerland

Switzerland sees the eleven guiding principles as an important consolidation of basic understandings on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS among the High Contracting Parties (HCP). The principles can guide current and future work in the multilateral context, notably the consideration and development of the normative and operational framework in the GGE. In addition, HCP may consider their operationalization at the national level, notably in the context of complying with international humanitarian law (IHL) rules and satisfying ethical concerns in the context of these emerging technologies.

### United Kingdom

While many areas of discussion are outstanding, the eleven guiding principles affirmed by the GGE in 2019 represent important areas of international consensus. They provide an excellent basis from which to develop a normative and operational framework to address emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. The challenge is how these can be operationalised by states. The UK offers the following perspective on how this could be best achieved by the GGE, chiefly by using existing work on the lifecycle of a weapon as a framework for the creation and implementation of a compendium of good practice.

### United States

The guiding principles serve as a foundation for the GGE’s future work and can also guide States in the responsible development and use of emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. The guiding principles are a cohesive framework with each principle reinforcing others.

### Venezuela

The agreement on the guiding principles, as a result of the work during the CCW meetings, is important and useful as a basis for legal regulations, both international and national on those weapons systems. It is of utmost importance that international humanitarian law continues to fully apply to all weapons systems, particularly to the development and use of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Venezuela deplores the existence of such weapons. In this sense, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela believes that the guiding principles and their potential operationalization are not sufficient to satisfy the need for a legally binding instrument that includes prohibitions and regulations regarding emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. The guiding principles are only a good basis for the progress of laws and treaties on the matter, therefore they should not be taken as regulations for their national implementation. The eleven guiding principles are a referential framework to advance in the negotiation of an eventual treaty and could be considered by each State in its national capacity, to develop, complement or create laws that determine its own regulations on the matter.



## Annex I: Country Views on Killer Robots



### Country Positions on Negotiating a Treaty to Ban and Restrict Killer Robots

September 2020

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots tracks the positions of all countries on the call to ban fully autonomous weapons and retain meaningful human control over the use of force. This document identifies states that have: 1) called for a ban on such weapons; 2) endorsed group statements calling for a treaty to prohibit and restrict them; 3) called moves to negotiate a new international treaty premature; and/or 4) commented publicly to elaborate their views on this issue.

For more information see the 2020 Human Rights Watch report “[Stopping Killer Robots](#)” and our website: [www.stopkillerrobots.org](http://www.stopkillerrobots.org)

#### 1. National statements calling for a ban

Since 2013, **30 countries** have called for a prohibition on fully autonomous weapons.

Alphabetical order

1. Algeria
2. Argentina
3. Austria
4. Bolivia
5. Brazil
6. Chile
7. China\*
8. Colombia
9. Costa Rica
10. Cuba
11. Djibouti
12. Ecuador
13. Egypt
14. El Salvador
15. Ghana
16. Guatemala
17. Holy See
18. Iraq
19. Jordan
20. Mexico
21. Morocco

22. Namibia
23. Nicaragua
24. Pakistan
25. Panama
26. Peru
27. State of Palestine
28. Uganda
29. Venezuela
30. Zimbabwe

#### Chronological order

1. Pakistan on [30 May 2013](#)
2. Ecuador on [13 May 2014](#)
3. Egypt on [13 May 2014](#)
4. Holy See on [13 May 2014](#)
5. Cuba on [16 May 2014](#)
6. Ghana on [16 April 2015](#)
7. Bolivia on 17 April 2015
8. State of Palestine on 13 November 2015
9. Zimbabwe on [12 November 2015](#)
10. Algeria on [11 April 2016](#)
11. Costa Rica on [11 April 2016](#)
12. Mexico on [13 April 2016](#)
13. Chile on [14 April 2016](#)
14. Nicaragua on 14 April 2016
15. Panama on 12 December 2016
16. Peru on 12 December 2016
17. Argentina on 12 December 2016
18. Venezuela on 13 December 2016
19. Guatemala on 13 December 2016
20. Brazil on 13 November 2017
21. Iraq on 13 November 2017
22. Uganda on 17 November 2017
23. Austria on 9 April 2018
24. China\* on 13 April 2018
25. Djibouti on 13 April 2018
26. Colombia on 13 April 2018
27. El Salvador on 22 November 2018
28. Morocco on [22 November 2018](#)
29. Jordan on 21 August 2019
30. Namibia on 24 October 2019

\* China [states that its call](#) is to ban the use of fully autonomous weapons, but not their development or production.

All except four (except Egypt, Ghana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe) are states parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), which has discussed concerns over lethal autonomous weapons systems since 2014.

## **2. Group statements calling for a new treaty**

Additionally, since 2018, approximately **50 CCW states parties have endorsed various group statements calling for a new international treaty to prohibit and restrict lethal autonomous weapons systems**. The endorsers of these group statement can be found below the following consolidated list:

1. Afghanistan
2. Antigua and Barbuda
3. Bahrain
4. Bangladesh
5. Belarus
6. Benin
7. Bolivia
8. Burkina Faso
9. Burundi
10. Cambodia
11. Cameroon
12. Cape Verde
13. Cote d'Ivoire
14. Cyprus
15. Dominican Republic
16. Gabon
17. Grenada
18. Guinea-Bissau
19. Honduras
20. India
21. Jamaica
22. Kuwait
23. Lao PDR
24. Lebanon
25. Lesotho
26. Liberia
27. Madagascar
28. Maldives
29. Mali
30. Malta
31. Mauritius
32. Mongolia
33. Niger
34. Qatar
35. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

36. Saudi Arabia
37. Senegal
38. Seychelles
39. Sierra Leone
40. South Africa
41. Sri Lanka
42. Philippines
43. Togo
44. Turkmenistan
45. Tunisia
46. United Arab Emirates
47. Uzbekistan
48. Zambia

This list does not include 17 other CCW states parties that have both called for a ban in their national capacity and endorsed one or more of the following group statements: Algeria, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Djibouti, Guatemala, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, State of Palestine, Uganda, and Venezuela.

### **Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)**

In March 2018, a CCW [working paper by the Non-Aligned Movement](#) called for a “legally binding international instrument stipulating prohibitions and regulations on lethal autonomous weapons systems.” Since then NAM representatives have repeated this call on multiple occasions. Of the 125 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members, 65 are CCW states parties: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Gabon, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Philippines, Togo, Turkmenistan, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Zambia.

### **Africa Group**

Benin [made a statement at the CCW in April 2018](#) on behalf group of African states that recommended negotiating a legally binding instrument “at the earliest” and found that “fully autonomous weapons systems or LAWS that are not under human control should be banned.” Of the 54 countries in Africa, 25 are CCW states parties: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia. All these states are also NAM members.

### **Arab Group**

Iraq made a statement at the CCW in September 2020 on behalf of the Arab states parties to the CCW, which called for a new treaty to prohibit and restrict lethal autonomous weapons systems, reiterated that other measures cannot replace the required legally binding instrument, and underscored the importance of maintaining human control over the critical functions of weapons. Of the 125 CCW states parties, 12 are from the Arab world: Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. All these states are also NAM members.

### **States that call a new international treaty on killer robots premature**

Approximately 10 states have repeatedly opposed negotiating a new international treaty on lethal autonomous weapons systems, calling such a move “premature.”

Australia  
France  
India  
Israel  
Netherlands  
Republic of Korea  
Russia  
Turkey  
United States  
United Kingdom

### **States that have commented on concerns raised by killer robots**

A total of 97 countries have publicly elaborated their views on lethal autonomous weapons systems in a multilateral forum since 2013: 44 states in 2013, eight in 2014, fifteen in 2015, fourteen in 2016, four in 2017, eight in 2018, and four in 2019.

Most commented via their statements to meetings of the Convention on Conventional Weapons in Geneva and annual sessions of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Almost two-dozen states spoke during the first debate on killer robots at the Human Rights Council in Geneva in May 2013.

1. Algeria on 30 May 2013
2. Argentina on 30 May 2013
3. Australia on 14 November 2013
4. Austria on 30 May 2013
5. Bangladesh on 21 October 2016
6. Belarus on 14 November 2013
7. Belgium on 11 November 2013
8. Bolivia on 17 April 2015
9. Botswana on 27 October 2015
10. Brazil on 30 May 2013
11. Bulgaria on 23 October 2014

12. Burkina Faso on 23 October 2017
13. Cambodia on 13 November 2017
14. Cameroon on 12 December 2016
15. Canada on 11 November 2013
16. Chile on 13 April 2015
17. China on 30 May 2013
18. Colombia on 17 April 2015
19. Costa Rica on 29 October 2013
20. Croatia on 15 November 2013
21. Cuba on 30 May 2013
22. Czech Republic on 13 May 2014
23. Denmark on 13 April 2015
24. Djibouti on 13 April 2018
25. Ecuador on 29 October 2013
26. Egypt on 30 May 2013
27. El Salvador on 29 October 2018
28. Estonia on 31 August 2016
29. Finland on 22 October 2014
30. France on 30 May 2013
31. Germany on 30 May 2013
32. Ghana on 14 November 2013
33. Greece on 29 October 2013
34. Guatemala on 16 May 2014
35. Holy See on 14 November 2013
36. Honduras on 13 April 2018
37. Hungary on 7 October 2016
38. India on 30 October 2013
39. Indonesia on 30 May 2013
40. Iran on 30 May 2013
41. Iraq on 13 November 2015
42. Ireland on 29 October 2013
43. Israel on 15 November 2013
44. Italy on 14 November 2013
45. Japan on 29 October 2013
46. Jordan on 31 August 2016
47. Kazakhstan on 13 November 2015
48. Kuwait on 26 October 2015
49. Latvia on 21 October 2016
50. Lebanon on 26 October 2015
51. Libya on 14 October 2019
52. Liechtenstein on 15 October 2018
53. Lithuania on 14 November 2013
54. Luxembourg on 30 April 2018
55. Madagascar on 14 November 2013
56. Mali on 13 May 2014
57. Mexico on 30 May 2013

58. Moldova, Rep. on 12 December 2016
59. Montenegro on 12 December 2016
60. Morocco on 30 May 2013
61. Myanmar on 10 October 2017
62. Namibia on 24 October 2019
63. Nepal on 11 October 2018
64. Netherlands on 29 October 2013
65. New Zealand on 30 October 2013
66. Nicaragua on 13 November 2015
67. North Macedonia on 19 November 2019
68. Norway on 13 May 2014
69. Pakistan on 30 May 2013
70. Palestine on 13 November 2014
71. Panama on 12 December 2016
72. Peru on 12 December 2016
73. Philippines on 14 April 2016
74. Poland on 13 April 2015
75. Portugal on 14 October 2014
76. Romania on 26 October 2015
77. Russia on 30 May 2013
78. San Marino, 16 October 2019
79. Sierra Leone on 30 May 2013
80. Slovakia on 12 December 2016
81. Slovenia on 12 December 2016
82. South Africa on 30 October 2013
83. South Korea on 14 November 2013
84. Spain on 11 November 2013
85. Sri Lanka on 13 April 2015
86. Sweden on 30 May 2013
87. Switzerland on 30 May 2013
88. Thailand on 29 October 2018
89. Tunisia on 17 October 2018
90. Turkey on 14 November 2013
91. Uganda on 17 November 2017
92. Ukraine on 14 November 2013
93. United Kingdom on 30 May 2013
94. United States on 30 May 2013
95. Venezuela on 13 December 2016
96. Zambia on 17 April 2015
97. Zimbabwe on 12 November 2015

## Annex II: Campaign Delegation List



### Campaign Delegation

Convention on Conventional Weapons  
Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems  
United Nations, Geneva, 21-25 September 2020

**Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, @bankillerrobots**

Head of Delegation: Ms. Mary Wareham, @marywareham (remote)  
Mr. Ousman Noor, @ousmannoor (primary in-person representative)  
Ms. Clare Conboy, @ClareConboy

**Article 36**

Elizabeth Minor

**Human Rights Watch, @hrw**

Mr. Steve Goose  
Ms. Bonnie Docherty

**Mines Action Canada, @MinesActionCan**

Mr. Paul Hannon, @PCHannon  
Ms. Erin Hunt, @erinlynnhunt

**PAX**

Mr. Frank Slijper

**SEHLAC, @SehlaOrg**

Mr. Camilo Serna