Campaign Comments on Draft Conclusions for the CCW GGE on lethal autonomous weapons systems

Provided to the informal consultation, Geneva, 15 May 2019

The chair’s non-paper dated 7 May 2019 and entitled “draft conclusions” elaborates on, but does not amend a set of ten “possible guiding principles” agreed last August by the CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) and noted in the report of the CCW’s annual meeting in November 2018.

Several principles (a, b, c, f, g, h, i) are followed by draft text produced by the chair, drawing on the 2018 GGE and reflecting where there was convergence at the March GGE meeting. Some text is in square brackets to note where the chair found “divergent views” and differences.

The draft conclusions do not address all parts of the “emerging commonalities, conclusions, and recommendations” annexed to the 2018 GGE report. The lack of reference to the “possible options for addressing” the challenges raised by LAWS is the most significant omission. That matters because it is what the CCW Review Conference mandated the GGE on LAWS to deliver.

If the CCW is deemed the appropriate framework for dealing with LAWS, then the GGE must explain what should be done to deal with the challenge. Expanding on the “possible guiding principles” agreed in 2018 does not suffice and will not satisfy rising public concerns over killer robots.

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots appreciates the chair’s efforts to reach convergence and foster common understandings. It offers the following suggestions in the spirit of cooperation and to help increase clarity and better reflect the GGE mandate and CCW discussions to date.

1. Elaborate the “possible options for addressing” the challenges raised by LAWS and explicitly reference the calls to negotiate new international law, including a legally binding instrument banning LAWS and/or requiring meaningful human control over the use of force. Highlight the necessity of responding to ethical and moral concerns, even if states have different views about their implications for the way forward.

2. Focus more on section b) on human control over the use of force. Beware that human “intervention” is a narrower concept, while human “responsibility” may be confused with the references to legal responsibility, a term used elsewhere in the document.
3. Simplify the characterization of LAWS in section h), which the Campaign views as weapons systems that—once activated—can detect, select and engage targets without meaningful human control.

4. Consider condensing the review of existing international humanitarian law (IHL) as the sections under principles a), c), and d) are repetitive.

5. Under section c) on accountability, add the reasons why human control must be maintained because a potential accountability gap is not the only one (e.g. for a range of ethical, legal, moral, technical, and security reasons). Sections e) and f) highlight several risks raised by LAWS, such as their proliferation and use by non-state armed groups, but other concerns are not mentioned.